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Abstract 
This thesis explores how framing of communication about project progress 
can influence beliefs about satisfaction, motivation to invest effort, and 
investment preferences. It further investigates the strength of feelings associated 
with over- and underperformances relative to reference points, and how 
contrasting performances with a reference point can influence motivation to 
overstate what has been achieved. It is also compares how describing 
performances in terms of work, money and time can shape perceptions, feelings 
and motivations.  
Study I explores how framing of project progress in terms of time and 
work can influence beliefs about whether performance is satisfactory and whether 
more effort needs to be invested. Work progress can be described in terms of 
how much is done versus how much remains to be completed. Temporal progress 
can be described in terms of time spent versus time left. Five experiments with 
responses from 503 participants (85% students, 15% managers) are reported 
showing that such frames have predictable implications. Statements by a team 
leader about time spent and work left are perceived as suggestions to “hurry up”, 
whereas complementary statements about work done and time left indicate that 
the team can take it more easy. The first set of statements further implies that 
the team is behind schedule, whereas the last two statements suggest that the 
team is ahead of the plan. In line with this, speakers preferred work done and 
time left statements when they were ahead of schedule, but not when they were 
behind. “Hurry up” and “behind schedule” interpretations were also shown to be 
dependent upon stage, being more prominent in the final stages than during the 
initial stages of a project. 
Study II explores how framing of project progress can reveal investment 
intentions in a sunk cost option. 193 participants (65% managers, 35% students) 
were asked to evaluate progress statements referring to a failing project. Past 
oriented statements about the amount work done, budget and time spent (75%), 
were perceived as a preference for the sunk costs option to a larger extent than 
future-oriented statements describing that 25% of the work, budget and time 
remained. But when progress was described relative to explicit reference points 
and qualitative modifiers were added to the numerical progress amounts, this 
strongly influenced the beliefs about investment intentions. Progress was 
described as more than 70% done/spent or less than 80% done/spent, more than 
20% or less than 30% remaining, and almost 50% done/spent or almost 50% 
remaining. These different ways of framing performance were interpreted as even 
stronger arguments in support of the two different investment options, depending 
on the perceived amounts of achievements compared with the perceived amounts 
of remaining resources.  
Study III compares the strength of positive and negative feelings 
associated with over- and underperformances in terms of money, performance 
time and completion time. Results from a questionnaire answered by 284 top and 
middle managers in six experimental conditions show that doing better than 
expected can generate stronger satisfaction than performing below expectations 
generates dissatisfaction. Managers also feel satisfied about performances that 
match expectations, and are more surprised by over- than by 
underperformances. Performance time (in terms of hours, days, or weeks) was 
judged similarly as monetary performance. However, when temporal performance 
was described as completion time relative to a milestone or a deadline, deviations 
became more salient and were expected to produce stronger feelings of 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction.  
Study IV investigates managers’ beliefs about goals and misconduct in 
terms of performance overstatements. 772 top- and mid-level managers 
predicted if reference points such as performance goals, budgets and plans can 
make it more likely that individuals and firms will exaggerate what they have 
achieved. Managers believe that goals can influence individuals to overstate 
performances, particularly in terms of time spent on a task. When goals are 
achieved, this is expected to inhibit motivation for overstating performances, for 
firms as well as individuals. For firms, performance relative to goals is not 
expected to influence misconduct. Low and high performing firms are believed to 
be equally prone to misconduct when they underperform relative to goals. When 
managers judge the likelihood of misconduct, they are influenced by the 
likelihood of goal achievement as well as the magnitudes of performance 
overstatement.  
The results from Study I and II are discussed in terms of how linguistic 
reference points and framing of communication can serve productive pragmatic 
purposes in communication at work. The results from Study III and IV are 
discussed in terms of how reference points, mental accounting, performance 
expectations, and performance dimensions (work, money, time) can influence 
feelings and motivations associated with performance deviations. 
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1 Introduction 
The title of this thesis “Reference Points at Work” highlights two central aspects of 
the present research: 1) how reference points “work” to influence beliefs, feelings 
and motivation; and 2) reference points in work contexts.  
The subtitle “Framing of performance, money and time” reflects the original 
research question: Is time really money? The first idea was to investigate if time 
is framed similarly as money, particularly related to progress in projects. Soon 
work became equally interesting. The logic was simple: organizations invest 
money and time to get work done; people invest work and time in return for 
money; organizational performance can be measured in terms of work 
achievements, money and time. I was interested in exploring if the psychological 
significance of performances accounted as work, money or time would differ.  
The four studies have come about over a period of several years. Throughout the 
research process, the studies were elaborated as separate ventures. This 
introduction therefore discusses the theoretical and conceptual aspects that are 
relevant to all the studies.  
1.1 Research questions  
In a broad sense the current thesis investigates two main questions: 
1. How do reference points in managers’ communication of project progress 
influence listeners’ understanding of whether project performance is 
satisfactory and whether one should invest more resources in a project?  
2. How does performance relative to a reference point influence feelings of 
satisfaction and motivation for overstating accomplishments? 
Question 1 is addressed in Study I and II, while question 2 is the focus of Study 
III and IV. More specifically the research questions explored and discussed in 
each study are: 
I. How does framing of progress in terms of past-oriented versus future-
oriented reference points influence beliefs about whether a project is 
developing as planned or should be accelerated?  
II. How does framing of progress in terms of past-oriented versus future-
oriented reference points suggest whether a manager is promoting further 


 
investments in an existing but failing project, or advocating to invest a 
new project instead?   
III. Do managers feel as satisfied with performances that exceed a reference 
point as they feel dissatisfied with underperformances?  
IV. Do managers believe that underperforming relative to a reference point 
can promote overstating of achievements?  
Study I and II explore how reference points in managers’ communication can 
enhance the meaning of a message, while Study III and IV illuminate emotional 
and motivational effects of contrasting performances with a reference point. 
1.2 Illustrations of the research questions 
To illustrate the research questions and to provide an overview of what the 
present studies focus on, the examples below correspond to the four research 
questions and the four studies of the present thesis.  
Study I: Looking back versus looking ahead 
What messages are these managers communicating to their teams?  
 Manager 1: You have done 50% of the work… 
 Manager 2: You have spent 50% of the time… 
Will the team members think they are ahead of schedule and can take it easy, or 
will they assume that their leader is telling them to hurry up and that they are 
behind the plan?  
Study II: Progress framing and sunk costs 
 Manager 1: We have done 75% of the work on project A, so… 
 Manager 2: We have more than 20% of the budget for project A left, so… 
What investment intentions do these managers have in mind? Do they plan to 
finish  project A that they already have spent substantial effort and resources on 
but that might fail, or would they prefer to invest the remaining resources on a 
new and more promising project?  
 


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Study III: Managers’ feelings about over- and underperformance 
 Employee 1: Has spent 20% less of the budget than expected 
 Employee 2: Has spent 20% more of the budget than expected 
 Employee 3: Delivers 2 hours before the deadline 
 Employee 4: Delivers 2 hours after the deadline 
How will managers feel about the performance of these employees? Will their 
feelings for over-performance be equally strong as their feelings for 
underperformance? Will they feel the same for good and poor performances 
accounted as time as for money?  
Study IV: Managers’ beliefs about misconduct 
Which of these two consultants will feel most tempted to overstate their weekly 
reports?  
 Consultant A:  Had a budget of 40 hours per week, had worked 36 hours that 
week 
 Consultant B:  Had worked 36 hours that week (but no budget) 
Which of these management teams will feel most tempted to overstate their 
performance? 
 Firm A: Had completed 9 projects that year, but had a budget of 10 projects 
 Firm B: Had planned to do their best, and completed 9 projects 
1.3 Overview of the summary 
This summary is further organized in four main sections.  
Section 2) Definitions and classifications will provide an overview of how central 
concept such as reference points, framing, work, money and time have been 
defined and classified in the literature. This section will also discuss theoretical 
accounts of reference points and framing effects.  
Section 3) Reference points and framing of progress and performance first 
presents the theoretical and conceptual foundations for Paper I and II.  These 
papers explore the conversational and pragmatic aspects of reference points in 


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communication at work. Next, the central theoretical foundations for Study III 
and IV are presented. This includes a discussion of the value function and its 
relevance to predicting feelings of satisfaction and motivation for overstating 
performances.  
Section 4) Summary of the studies opens with a presentation of methods, 
participants and data collection common for all of the four studies, followed by 
brief summaries of empirical findings from Study I-IV.  
Section 5) General discussion first focuses on Study I and II.  The findings from 
these two papers are compared, and the implications of framed messages in 
organizational communication are discussed in more depth. It is discussed how it 
can be productive to frame opinions depending on the pragmatic demands of the 
communication situation. Next, as is addressed in Paper III, managers’ feelings 
about over- and underperformances are discussed. The last part provides a more 
in-depth discussion of the results from paper IV related to perspectives on 
behavioral ethics. The discussion section concludes with reflections on how the 
performance dimensions work, money and time are framed across the four 
studies.  
2 Definitions and classifications  
This section discusses the central concepts relevant for the four present studies: 
reference point and framing, and the performance dimensions work, money and 
time.  
2.1 Definitions of reference points and framing  
Reference points have a long history in psychology and date back to the early 
habituation and psychophysical studies. Put simply, a reference point is what one 
has become accustomed to perceiving or expecting. Reference points are 
adjustable and serve as contrasts that novel stimuli are compared with. Thus, 
perception and judgment are “reference dependent” (Brown, 1953; Helson, 1964; 
Kahneman, 2003): what we perceive depends on what we compare it with, and 
changes in stimulation capture our attention. Social judgments are comparative 
(Festinger, 1954; Mussweiler, 2003), and calculations of monetary value are 
influenced by changes in relative wealth rather than absolute wealth (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979; Markowitz, 1952).  


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Merriam-Webster on-line dictionary defines “reference point” as “an indicator that 
orients you generally”, and suggest several synonyms such as “standards”, 
“benchmarks”, “norms”, “milestones”, “markers” and “anchors”. The synonyms 
indicate that a wide range of variables can serve as explicit or implicit reference 
points in organizations, ranging from formal goals, plans, budgets and 
performance standards to subjective or personal expectations or aspirations.  
Generally speaking, framing refers to viewing the same situation from different 
angles. As a visual metaphor, changing the frame adjusts the perspective we 
have on the stimuli in the situation. The concept of framing can further refer to 
what perspectives, ideas or beliefs a person has about a domain. A frame can be 
defined as “an underlying assumption or set of assumptions that supports an 
interpretation or a concept and that functions as an interpretative frame of 
reference for thinking about the concept” (Colman, 2011). These can refer to 
single or multiple dimensions of a domain or situation (Druckman, 2011). Such 
frames can direct peoples’ attention to certain aspects of a situation, option or 
choice, and potentially influence how incoming stimuli are judged, evaluated and 
acted upon.  
Reference points and framing are closely linked concepts. Reference points allow 
us to describe the same situation from two different angles, or to be framed in 
two different ways. The visual analog is the well-known reversible figures where 
the same figure can be interpreted in two different ways. When one of the figures 
(for example the light one) is seen as the figure, the other (e.g. dark one) is 
perceived as the ground. The dark part becomes the reference point that the light 
one is judged against. People are able to visually perceive only one figure at a 
time: when people attend to the dark one, it is impossible for them to see the 
light one at the same time. The same can apply for frames in judgment and 
decision-making. When people focus on one frame, this requires their full 
attention and processing capacity in a way that aspects of the opposite frame do 
not come to mind and are not part of the judgment or choice. Following the visual 
analogy, framing effects have also been called contrast effects. Framing occurs 
when one attribute is contrasted or compared with another based on where the 
reference point is placed or how it is formulated.  
In judgment and decision-making, framing typically refers to describing the same 
amount or attribute in two different, but logically equivalent ways (Keren, 2011). 
Based on how the reference point is formulated, the same value, option or 

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attribute can be described from two different angles, making them appear 
gains/losses or positive/negative. Typical examples are that a cup can be half full 
or half empty, ham can be 90% fat free or contain 10% fat, an investment can 
have 50% chance of success or 50% chance of failure, and the same operation 
can have a 95% survival or a 5% mortality rate. Such statements are logically 
equivalent. However, when they are perceived as psychologically different, they 
are called framing effects.  
Of central relevance to the present studies is the distinction between frames of 
mind, framed messages in communication, and perceptions of framed messages. 
This thesis focuses primarily on message framing and how such frames are 
interpreted (i.e. and not how frames of mind influence what message is 
communicated). A core feature of framing is that one aspect or dimension of an 
option or performance is highlighted, making others less salient or significant.  
2.2 Classifications and explanations of reference points and framing 
effects 
Framing effects in decision making were introduced through the famous “Asian 
disease problem” where risk preferences for a prospect formulated in terms of 
“lives lost” differed from the same outcome framed in terms of “lives saved” 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Framing effects have been observed in a number 
of other risky decisions as well as in more simple judgment tasks (for reviews, 
see Keren, 2011; Kühberger, 1998; Levin, Schneider & Gaeth, 1998; Soman, 
2004).  
A central distinction in framing research is between the bias-perspective and the 
conversational approach (Keren, 2011). In the bias-perspective, framing has 
typically been treated as an “irrational” judgment error that violates the axiom of 
descriptive invariance: preferences and evaluations should not affect how a 
quantity is described, as long it is referred to the same objective state of affairs 
(Snelbecker & Roszknowski 1990; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Van Buiten & 
Keren, 2009). Framing is an intuitive “System 1” process (Kahneman, 2003, 
2011): automatic, fast and associative.  
In contrast, the conversational approach is interested in how framing can enable 
effective communication and serve pragmatic functions between speakers and 
listeners. A broader definition of equivalence between framed messages is used; 
they should have “informational equivalence” and not just “logical equivalence” as 

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in the bias-approach (Keren, 2011, p. 5; Mandel, 2001; Sher & McKenzie, 2006, 
2011). Informational equivalence is to transmit the same “core information”, 
making it more ambiguous what it means to frame a statement in equivalent 
ways. Both the bias- and conversational perspectives on framing influence the 
present studies. Study I and II build upon to the conversational perspective, 
while Study III and IV illustrate how reference points can skew managers’ 
feelings and motivations, thus locating these closer to the bias perspective.  
In the literature inspired by the bias-perspective, several types of framing effects 
have been proposed. Levin, Schneider and Gaeth (1998) suggested that there are 
three types of “valence framing”: attribute framing, risky choice framing and goal 
framing. Attribute framing involves describing the same item or characteristic in 
two opposite ways, one clearly negative and the other positive. In risky choice 
framing people are confronted with two options, one uncertain or risky and the 
other sure or certain, such as in the Asian disease problem. In goal framing, the 
framing manipulation involves the positive consequences of attaining the goal 
versus the negative consequences of not attaining the goal. Soman (2004) 
differentiates between outcome, structure and task framing. Outcome framing 
refers to how the outcomes are formulated (gains vs. losses, aggregated vs. 
disaggregated quantities); structure framing refers to how the framing task is 
organized (integration or segregation of information, contingent or sequential 
tasks), while task framing is about the nature of the framing task (choosing or 
rejecting options, recommending or not recommending an alternative). Study I 
and II are examples of attribute framing where project progress is stated in 
opposite and complementary ways, while Study III and IV can be classified as 
outcome framing or task framing studies.  
Several explanations for the effects of reference points on framing effects have 
been proposed. It is for example discussed if the processes underlying the 
different forms of framing actually are different, and how several different 
psychological processes can produce framing effects (Keren, 2011). Although 
several of the explanations seem to converge towards a similar set of processes, 
there are nuances and differences that go beyond the scope of the present thesis 
to discuss in depth.  
The dominant and most common explanation is that a reference point splits the 
range of outcomes in two, and that gains and losses are judged based on the 
value function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The value function will be further 
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discussed below in section 3.2. In his review Kühberger (1998) discusses five 
different theoretical accounts for how reference points can influence framing 
effects, that differ in terms of non-risk and risky choices (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979), reversal of risk seeking and risk averse preferences for small pay offs 
(Markowitz, 1952), predictions of risk preferences derived from the probability 
weighting function leading to increasing risk aversion for increasing 
gains/probability of payoffs and decreasing risk aversion for increasing absolute 
payoffs/probability of losses (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1990), and reversal of risk 
preferences (Shafir, Osherson & Smith, 1993). Kühberger (1998) also discusses 
four cognitive processing models that suggest how framing can depend on the 
content, importance and problem domain. This variety of perspectives on 
reference points and framing effects shows that this is not a unified field of 
scientific inquiry, and that there are different views on how reference points and 
the value function influences judgments, feelings and motivations.  
Framing can also be influenced by “compatibility” (Brendl, 2001, Fitts & Seeger, 
1953; Shafir, 1995), which is that certain stimuli attributes, or mental 
representations of stimuli, correspond more with certain responses. In the Asian 
disease problem, the “positive/sure” option is more compatible with the positive 
“lives saved” outcome, while the “negative/risky” option is more compatible with 
the negative “lives lost” outcome. Compatibility is assumed to take place early in 
the perceptual process, and to organize the incoming message and align it with 
possible interpretations.  
Explanations in terms of attention and priming refer to that frames can direct our 
attention to certain attributes or cues, and stimulate people to be more 
“perceptually ready” (Bruner, 1957) for inferring the categorical identity of a 
stimuli. Frames can also influence how accessible positive and negatives 
associations are in memory (Levin, 1987; Levin, Schneider & Gaeth, 1998). 
Another explanation is that framing effects can be caused by valence-based 
encoding of information and cognitive search for confirming evidence (Levin, 
Schneider & Gaeth, 1998).  
Studies have shown that positive and negative frames might be differently 
processed. Negative frames can induce a negative emotional state associated 
with a more controlled mode of cognitive processing (Dunegan, 1993). Negative 
frames have been associated with slower response times (Gonzales, Dana, 
Koshino & Just, 2005). De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour & Dolan (2006) observed 
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increased activity in amygdala when people chose the sure-option in a gain frame 
and gamble-option in loss frame, suggesting that these judgments are influenced 
by affective cognitive systems. These studies suggest that framing is associated 
with activation of affective cognitive systems and processes, and that further 
neuropsychological research can provide insight about the cognitive processes 
underlying framing effects.  
To summarize, framing effects are assumed to take place early in the processing 
of incoming stimuli, where decision makers a) match characteristics of a frame 
with the expected response or choice, b) are influenced by what memory 
associations the frame evokes, and c) judge the valence of a frame based on 
whether the reference point and value function suggest it is a positive or negative 
outcome. The conceptual foundations for the performance dimensions work, 
money and time will be examined in the next section, before reference points and 
the value function are further discussed in the subsequent section. 
2.3 Definitions and classifications of work, money and time 
In the present studies progress and performance are described as amounts of 
work, money or time. In most organizations these are commonly used 
dimensions to account achievement and to evaluate whether they are 
satisfactory. The focus is on the psychological significance of how performances 
are accounted. In this section I will present the conceptual foundations for the 
three performance dimensions, and compare how they are similar and different to 
one another. It worth noting that work, money, and time not are included in the 
Oxford Dictionary of Psychology (Colman, 2011). The definitions below are 
therefore based on the general Merriam-Webster on-line Dictionary (if not 
otherwise referred to).  
The concept of “work” means to perform an action to achieve an objective (and is 
defined as“…do or perform something” and “sustained physical or mental effort to 
overcome obstacles and achieve an objective or result”. “Performance” is a 
closely related concept that is about “the execution of an action”.  
The concept of  “time” is clearly associated with work, as several of the temporal 
definitions refer to what events or actions that take place relative to a temporal 
continuum or to a point in time: “the period during which an action, process, or 
condition exists or continues”, “a non-spatial continuum that is measured in 
terms of events which succeed one another from past to through present to 
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future”, “the point or period when something occurs”, a “…moment…for 
something to happen, begin, or end”, a “period” or “duration”, “a rate of speed” 
and a “moment, hour, day, or “year as indicated by a clock or calendar”, but also 
“the hours or days required to be occupied by one’s work”.   
On the conceptual level, money seems to be unrelated to work and time: it is just 
a “measure of value or wealth” or “a means for payment” or exchange. However, 
in organizations money is closely related to work and time. Models of 
organizational effectiveness suggest how to manage work effort, time and 
monetary outcomes (Eisenhardt, 1989): people want to spend less time and 
invest less work than what benefits the organization, so time and effort most be 
monitored, managed and controlled, and incentivized by money. Thus, money 
and time are resources that organizations invest or consume to get work done 
and achieve their goals, or are outcomes that define how well the organization 
performs. Money and time are scarce resources that organizations spend or 
invest. In some cases they can be exchanged; organizations pay more to save 
time or invest time to save money. Time is an equally distributed resource, but 
money is not equally available to all. Time is less liquid and fungible than money; 
it cannot be stored or inventoried for later use.  However, organizational rhetorics 
about money and time are similar: investing, saving, spending, wasting, 
consuming, or loosing. Individuals spend time at work and are rewarded with 
money, and some wealthy people choose not to spend time at work because they 
do not need the money. For some professions time at work is synonymous with 
monetary outcomes. In projects, money and time is invested to promote work 
progress, and work progress can be directly associated with monetary and time 
investments. 
The way the definitions of time refer to the activities that take place as time 
passes, suggest how humans have attempted to objectify the abstract concept of 
“time” by linking it to what can be observed or done while it passes. Temporal 
classification models (see for example Anacona, Okhuysen & Perlow, 2001; 
Bluedorn, 2002; McGrath and Tschan, 2004) also focus on time in relation with 
organizational activity. In “subjective” time (Bluedorn, 2002; Slife, 1993) activity 
and psychological experience are intimately associated. Also called event time, 
epochal time (Bluedorn, 2002) or social time (Bluedorn & Denhardt, 1988), this 
kind of time is a social construction shared by organizational members; the event 
or behavior itself defines it temporal location and significance, such as “lunch 
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time” or “banana time” (Roy, 1960). In contrast, the conception of “objective” 
time (Bluedorn, 2002) defines time and work as two independent dimensions. 
This kind of time flows forward at a uniform rate at all times and in all places 
independent of events, objects and observers. Also called clock time, fungible 
time or Newtonian time, this kind of time can be divided into similar and 
objectively quantifiable and measurable units.  
Most organizational research is influenced by the objective time paradigm. 
Performance, efficiency and effectiveness are concepts associated with this 
temporal perspective; effective organizations do not waste time and 
organizational effectiveness can be measured by how well time is spent and how 
quickly tasks are completed. Projects are organizational tasks where the objective 
aspects of time are salient; they are typically scheduled to last specific amounts 
of time, amounts or hours the project task will required are calculated and 
budgeted, and performance is measured as amounts of time spent relative to the 
amounts planned. Some organizations even account “work progress” as the 
number of hours spent. Thus, there are apparently quite a high number of 
different ways work and time can be associated (see e.g Anacona, Okhuysen & 
Perlow, 2001; McGrath & Tschan, 2004).  
The progress formulations and performance statements in the present studies are 
clearly influenced by the objective time paradigm; project progress is formulated 
as amounts of work completed or time spent relative to the starting points and 
completion points; temporal performances are described as amounts of additional 
or less work completed relative to the reference point, or as amounts of time 
saved or lost in completion of tasks, or as task completion times relative to 
temporal milestones. These definitions progress and performance in the present 
studies correspond to three of the fourteen (14!) possible relations between time 
and action suggested by McGrath and Tschan (2004): frequency, duration and 
temporal location. Frequency refers to the number of times an event takes place 
within a unit of time; increasing frequency will logically lead to higher task 
progress. Duration refers to the amount of time (hours, days, weeks, months or 
years) between onset and completion of an event; reducing frequency of a task 
will logically increase duration as less work gets done per unit of time. When time 
working on a task is accounted for as duration (hours, days, etc), these amounts 
can translate to monetary values as each unit of time can be given a price or a 
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cost. Completion time is an example of the concept of temporal location, and 
refers to when a task is completed relative to milestones or deadlines.  
Thus, to summarize, the performance dimensions work, money and time have 
several common features, but are also distinctly different from one another. All 
three are resources that organizations invest or spend, and can be accounted as 
outputs that indicate organizational efficiency. The purpose of the present 
research has been to investigate if the psychological significance of performances 
can vary dependent on which performance dimension they are accounted in. The 
purpose of the discussion above was to point to underlying similarities and 
differences in the concepts of work, money and time that might impact such 
judgments. This question will be further discussed in the last section of this 
summary (see 5.3 Conclusions). In the next sections the focus is on how framing 
of performance information can be of central importance to how achievements 
are judged.   
3 Reference points and framing of progress and performance 
3.1 Reference points and framing of project progress 
Study I and II investigate how differently framed project progress statements can 
communicate different perspectives on project performance. This linguistic and 
pragmatic perspective on framing focuses on the interaction between speakers 
and listeners (Grice, 1975). Reference points and framed messages can be an 
effective way to communicate a perspective or belief (Clark & Schober, 1992; 
McCann & Higgins, 1992). In natural language reference points can be embedded 
in the way a message is formulated (Keren, 2011). When a speaker chooses a 
particular reference point or frame this can accentuate his perceptions or beliefs, 
which enables the listener to infer the intended meaning of the message. 
Information about a speaker’s intentions can thus indirectly “leak” through how 
the reference point is stated or how the message is framed (McKenzie & Nelson, 
2003; Sher & McKenzie, 2006).  
Thus, reference points and frames can serve productive communicative and 
pragmatic functions, and enable effective exchanges between speakers and 
listeners. This perspective emphasizes informational equivalence in framed 
messages; they do not need to be stringently logically equivalent (Keren, 2011). 
Even logically equivalent frames can communicate implicit information about 
different reference points: a statement about a half full glass may point to that it 
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is far from empty; saying that it is half empty glass might suggest that it is far 
from full. Half full glasses can seem more attractive than half empty ones, 
perhaps because the first perspective indicates a positive trend towards complete 
fullness.  
Attribute framing has typically been observed on clearly positive and negative 
dimensions: it is better to win than to loose, successful stocks are more attractive 
than unsuccessful ones and people prefer operations described as survival rates 
rather than death rates. Study I investigated how seemingly neutral progress 
statements can carry information about speakers’ feelings and suggestions. The 
statements framed progress relative to the start of the project and accentuated 
the amounts of time spent or work done, or accentuated how much was left until 
the project was finished. Switching the reference point framed the amounts of 
project progress in two complementary ways: 40% of the time can be spent or 
60% is left: work progress can be 60% complete or 40% remaining to be done. 
Such progress statements can influence listeners’ assumptions by pointing to 
lower or higher reference points and linguistically suggesting that the amounts of 
progress are substantial or insignificant. Statements about how much work is 
done refer to a lower reference point, perhaps suggesting that amounts of 
progress are higher than expected. Statements about time spent also refer to a 
lower reference point, but perhaps suggest that more than expected has been 
spent, implying that progress is worse than anticipated. Thus, switching the 
reference point in project progress statements from work done to time spent 
might influence listeners to frame the meaning of a message differently.  
Study I focuses on the implicit meanings of quantitative progress statements, and 
how opposite frames can communicate different satisfaction with project progress 
and expectations about future efforts. Study II investigates how qualitative 
modifiers can intensify the meaning embedded in quantitative progress 
statements, and what investment intentions the speakers can have in mind. This 
study addresses how people infer meaning from how quantities are formulated. 
Previous studies have shown that qualitative quantifiers can serve pragmatic 
functions and influence what aspects of a situation the listener attends to and 
how it is judged (Moxey, 2011), even if no quantities are explicitly mentioned. 
Verbal statements of probabilities can be framed by selecting a positive or a 
negative verbal phrase. “A few” can be interpreted positively, but “few” can be 
perceived negatively, even if both statements implicitly can refer to just about the 
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same amount (Moxey & Sanford, 1993). Moxey and Sanford distinguish between 
“the reference set” which is explicitly mentioned in a statement and the 
“complement set” which is not explicitly mentioned. Positive quantifiers point 
listeners’ attention to what is satisfactory and can be interpreted as 
recommendations for a particular option or course of action (e.g. ”a few have 
been pleased with this outcome…”), while negative ones can communicate the 
opposite meaning (e.g “few have been pleased with this outcome…”). Moxey 
(2011) suggests that positive and negative quantifies can have the same effect as 
positive and negative verbs - such as “save vs. die” in the Asian disease problem.  
Study II further investigated how qualitative modifiers that refer to progress 
intervals can influence listeners’ assumptions about the significance of the 
amounts spent or remaining. Teigen (2008) distinguishes between point 
estimates (about X%), range estimates (between X% and Y%), and one-sided 
uncertainty intervals (more than X” or “less than Y”). “More than” and “less than” 
are linguistic modifiers that leak information and suggest that the performance 
amount should be contrasted to the reference values. “More than 70%” is clearly 
positive, whereas “less than 80%” indicates a shortfall. “More than 20%” can 
sound more significant than “less than 30%” depending of the valence of the 
dimension the values refer to. This kind of progress statements are not logically 
equivalent, but can be considered to be similar information wise. The first phrase 
could in principle mean any percentage from 70 to 100, and the second any 
percentage from 0 to 80. However, people typically think that both these 
expressions refer to values in the 70-80% interval, so they could in practice be 
regarded as two ways of expressing the same range of magnitudes. Study II 
compares how point estimates of progress are interpreted relative to such range 
estimates.  
In summary, the linguistic reference points that are explored in Study I and II 
refer to the amounts of project progress that has been achieved, or to the 
amounts that remain. The framing manipulation involves comparing the 
significance of the amounts that have been completed or consumed, versus the 
magnitudes that remain. The valence of the performance needs to be inferred 
based on the implicit value of the reference point. The performances are not 
clearly below or above an explicit reference point such as a goal or a plan. 
However, this is the focus of Study III and IV, where the affective and 
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motivational effects of contrasting a performance with an explicit reference point 
are explored, which I now turn to.  
3.2 References points and framing of performance 
Theoretically Study III and IV are inspired by the value function of prospect 
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and the principles of mental accounting (to 
be further discussed in the next section)(Thaler, 1985). The original idea was that 
over- and underperformances can be accounted as gains and losses, and that the 
associated feelings and motivations would follow the logic of the value function.  
As discussed above, the dominant explanation for framing effects is that 
reference points split the range of outcomes in two, and that gains and losses are 
evaluated based on the principles of the value function. The value function and 
mental accounting are closely associated concepts. Kahneman & Tversky (1979) 
suggested that in decision processes reference points first split the range of 
outcomes into gains and losses, which then based on mental accounting are 
integrated or segregated to maximize hedonic utility. After this primary editing, 
prospects are evaluated based on the value and weighting functions. Based on a 
similar logic, Thaler (1985) suggested that the valuation of a mental account 
follows the value function, and that gains and losses are processed differently to 
maximize hedonic value and experienced pleasure. People will tend to segregate 
multiple gains, but to integrate multiple losses. Smaller losses are integrated in 
greater gains, while smaller gains tend to be segregated from greater losses.  
Prospect theory was originally a descriptive (Hardman, 2009; Hastie & Dawes, 
2010) model for decision-making in certain situations. Kahneman & Tversky 
(1992) later developed cumulative prospect theory, a modified version to explain 
decision-making under uncertainty. It is further distinguished between three 
types of utilities (Kahneman & Snell, 1990; Kahneman, Wakker & Sarin, 1997): 
decision utilities (the value of outcomes), experienced utilities (the hedonic 
experience associated with an outcome), and predicted utilities (the predicted 
experience or valuation of an outcome).  
The value function is S-shaped, steeper below the reference point than above it, 
concave for gains and convex for losses (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. The value function of prospect theory (Kahneman, 2011) 
If managers’ feelings about over- and underperformance follow the principles of 
the value function in prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), one would 
expect managers to be more displeased by underperformances than they will be 
pleased by over-performances. Due to the s-shaped form of the value function, 
which makes it steeper just below the reference point than above, similar 
amounts of over- and underperformance will be asymmetrically evaluated, with 
losses having greater impacts than gains. It has been claimed that losses 
typically are weighted approximately twice as strongly as gains (Kahneman, 
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991, 1992). The feelings 
associated with gains and losses are supposed to follow the same pattern: “the 
aggravation that one experiences in losing a sum of money appears to be greater 
than the pleasure with gaining the same amount” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 
279).  
Further, in terms of managers’ beliefs about motivation for overstating 
performances, several predictions can be derived from the value function. Similar 
performances will be differently evaluated depending on what reference values 
they are compared with. Introducing a reference point can make a performance 
seem positive or negative depending the value of the reference point. Given the 
stronger weighting of losses versus gains, it should more tempting to exaggerate 
below the reference point than above. Due to loss aversion, those who 
underperform relative to their reference point will feel more motivated to invest 
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effort, but perhaps also more motivated to exaggerate what they have achieved. 
The S-shape of the value function implies diminishing sensitivity to changes in 
value further from the reference point, so that it will be more tempting to 
exaggerate performances close to the goal. In this section of the value function, 
one added performance amount is associated with relatively stronger increases in 
psychological value. Losses are associated with risk seeking, and performing 
below the reference point might thus increase the willingness to choose the risky 
option of cheating to enhance performance outputs.  
Mental accounting shows that similar amounts or values can be psychologically 
different based on which account they are judged within. This means that 
performances will be judged not only relative to a reference point, but also based 
on how they turn out relative to the scope and magnitude of the mental account 
they belong to. In the next section the relevance of mental accounting of work, 
money and temporal performances will be further discussed.  
3.3 Mental accounting of performance 
Originally, mental accounting referred to how people “record, summarize and 
analyze their expenses and consumption with the objective of making a decision” 
(Thaler, 1999, p. 184). Recently, the principles of mental accounting have been 
extended to other dimensions as well (Soman & Ahn, 2011). People can be 
triggered to define mental accounts when they decide to pursue a particular 
consumption opportunity, or when they plan how to allocate their financial 
resources. Mental accounting has been seen as an irrational bias by some 
researchers, as people might make suboptimal decisions depending on how they 
account for incomes and expenditures (Heath & Soll, 1996; McGraw, Tetlock & 
Kristel, 2003; Soman & Ahn, 2011). Mental accounting can also be defines as 
kind of framing, as similar amounts of money are perceived to be psychologically 
different based on which account they belong to.  
The scope and temporal horizons of mental accounts refer to how broad the 
categories of incomes and expenses in an account are, and for how short or long 
time-horizons expenses are cut off. Some expenses are logically accounted for on 
a daily or weekly basis (e.g. coffee and snacks) while others are psychologically 
monitored on a monthly (e.g. rent, utility bills) or yearly basis (e.g. insurance, 
memberships), based on frequency of consumption as well as payment schedules 
(Gourville, 1999). How frequently people “cut off” their mental accounts can also 
influence how much time they choose to invest at work. Camerer, Babcock, and 
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Loewenstein (1997) suggest that inexperienced taxi drivers in New York mentally 
define a daily income target and stop working when this goal is achieved, rather 
than defining an extended temporal account and adapt their work investments 
based on what is most time-efficient and profitable over a longer period of time. 
In Study III and IV performance accounts with different scope (work, money, and 
time) and temporal horizons (short term: days and weeks versus longer term 
months and years) are compared. Two main categories of performance deviations 
are investigated in both studies: small and less significant ones that individuals 
typically are accountable for during the course of a day or week at work; and 
greater and more significant ones that management teams and firms are 
accountable for and that accumulate during the course of a year.  
A central question is whether performance deviations are judged relative to the 
total value of an account or in absolute terms. If they are judged in proportional 
terms, smaller and greater accounts can be compared based on the relative 
amount of deviation. For example, spending 40,000 of a 50,000 budget will be 
judged just as positively as spending 8 million of a 10 million budget, as both 
cases involve saving about 20% of the total account. But if deviations are judged 
in absolute terms, the nominally greater saving of 2 million will seem more 
significant than saving 10.000. In one of the original mental accounting studies 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) it was found that peoples’ choices were most 
strongly influenced by the proportional amount they could save: more 
respondents (68%) found it attractive to drive 20 minutes to save $5 off a 
calculator that cost $15, while fewer respondents (29%) were willing to drive 20 
minutes to save $5 off a calculator that cost $120. Related to the present studies, 
it is expected that the amounts of deviation will be judged like this in terms of 
their proportional value. The feelings associated with less significant amounts of 
over-and underperformance will be similar to more significant ones, as long as 
they are proportionally similar. The motivation to overstate smaller performances 
will be similar to greater ones, as long as the relative amount of deviation is 
similar. This reasoning also implies that managers’ accounting of work, money, 
and time performance deviances will be similar as long as the deviations are 
proportionally comparable. Thus, spending 20% more or less time will probably 
be perceived as comparable with spending 20% more or less money, or doing 
20% more or less work.  
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Thaler (1985) suggested that people intuitively integrate or segregate gains and 
losses to maximize their hedonic value. This implies that managers might 
segregate over-performances, but integrate underperformances in the total 
account to enhance the positive valence of over-achievements. But segregation of 
performance deviations might also be influenced by what dimension they are 
accounted in. For example, temporal performance can be measured as 
performance time or completion time (Halkjelsvik & Jørgensen, 2011). 
Completion time refers to when tasks are finished relative to temporal milestones 
or deadlines. Accounted this way, over-performance is to deliver before the 
temporal reference point, and underperformance is to be delayed. Subsequently, 
accounting for performance as completion time might make the amounts of over- 
and underperformance more salient: the amount of time after the temporal 
reference point is clearly an explicit loss, while the time saved before is clearly a 
gain. Thus, stating performances relative to a temporal milestone might promote 
segregation of the over- and underperformance relative to the total account. The 
emotional intensity of over-performances can therefore be stronger for 
completion time than performance time. 
 
To summarize, the first part of the summary has discussed the conceptual 
foundation for how reference points, framing and mental accounting can influence 
beliefs, feelings and motivation. In the next section the results from the individual 
studies will be briefly presented, and issues related to the research methodology 
discussed in depth.  
4 Summary of the studies 
4.1 Methods, participants and data collection 
Research design, participants and methods for data collection are thoroughly 
presented in each of the individual Papers. Thus, in this section the methods are 
just briefly presented, while emphasis is put on the discussion of issues related to 
the research methodology.  
The present studies investigate beliefs based on responses to short vignettes 
about situations at work. The responses were in all studies expectations or 
predictions about how others will react, feel or act in hypothetical situations. 
According to Baron (2007), this is one of the most common and frequently used 
methods in decision research. This method allowed us to isolate the effects of 
framed communication, and the impact of different performance levels and 
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performance dimensions. The hypothetical vignettes allowed exploration of 
aspects of communication and judgments that are typically difficult to 
systematically observe in natural work situations. Based on knowledge about the 
firms and participants, the vignettes were designed to correspond to situations 
the participants would have experience with or situations that they intuitively 
could imagine.  
In all conditions of Study I-IV the participants were randomly allocated to one of 
the experimental conditions, to prevent that characteristics of the participants 
would systematically skew the responses. Many of the experiments and sub-
studies within each main Study were designed as between group comparisons.  
The majority of participants in Study II, III and IV were experienced top-level and 
mid-level managers, recruited from a broad range of different organizations, and 
with personal experience and knowledge of the questions and domains of the 
studies. In Study I and II the student participants judged the vignettes similarly 
as the managers, suggesting that the studies explored ways of framing progress 
that might not only be relevant to business projects, but other tasks as well. A 
majority of the managers in the four studies were male and between 40-50 years 
old, and had several years of experience with being managers. They are therefore 
representative of the typical population of managers in many organizations, but 
the responses might not be typical for younger managers or female managers. 
The respondents were recruited from different industries, such as oil- and gas, 
telecom, energy, food, pharmaceuticals, public transportation and law, which 
reduces the probability that we observed effects are due to industry specific 
business cultures or beliefs. Most of the firms were Norwegian firms with 
international subsidiaries or the Norwegian subsidiaries of international firms with 
a Western business culture. Since most of the respondents were Norwegian 
managers and the surveys were designed by researchers based in Norway, we 
assume that the results are typical of this group of managers’ beliefs, but perhaps 
not for how managers with a different cultural background might judge and 
communicate about performance. In Study I and II the majority managers were 
mid-level ones, while in Study III and IV most were top-level ones. Analysis of 
the responses from the different sub-groups of respondents indicate no 
systematic differences or interactions, indicating that the respondents’ experience 
and role have not skewed the results in a particular direction.  


 
In Study I and II and parts of Study IV the responses were collected during 
breaks in workshops and lectures, and in Study III and most of Study IV through 
a web based survey program. Survey completion during workshop or lecture 
breaks might reduce data quality due to time pressure, noise, being disturbed or 
influenced by other participants. However, the benefit of this approach is the high 
response rate; typically over 90%. Completing the questionnaire individually on a 
computer screen can increase focus and concentration, but in most conditions led 
to greater variations in response rates, from 40% to 90%. The response rates for 
the individual firms that participated were substantially higher than for the ones 
recruited through their industry organizations, suggesting that firm commitment 
and being invited by a manager whom you personally know can influence 
motivation to respond. We have no information about the beliefs of the managers 
who did not respond. However, the response rates were equally high across all 
conditions that were compared, indicating  that the observed effects were not 
influenced by such differences.    
When designing the conditions and vignettes substantial effort was put into 
ensuring that the different versions were logically and “information wise” 
comparable. In Study I “having spent 30%” of the time is clearly the same as 
“having 70% of the time left”, and “having done 70% of the work” is the same as 
“having 30% left to do”. In Study II the progress statements were logically 
comparable as “more then 70%” done or spent refers to the same range of 
amounts as “less than 30%” remaining. In Study III the focus was to make the 
amounts of money and performance time and completion time seem similar, as 
well as the amounts of over- and underperformance. Here a couple of minor 
inconsistencies are worth noting, even if they are not assumed to reduce the 
validity of the results of the study. In Vignette 1 where a total budget is not 
mentioned, it can be questioned if a NOK 3000 monetary deviation is comparable 
with a two-hour temporal deviation. In the other vignettes, the performance 
amounts were defined as absolute amounts relative to the total budget, as 
absolute amounts and percentages in combination and as percentages alone, to 
prevent that the presentation format influenced the results in a systematic way. 
In terms of making the amounts of over- and underperformance similar, the 
absolute values are similar in both sets of vignettes.  
The present studies based on responses to hypothetical vignettes illuminate 
managers’ beliefs about how people at work will interpret progress and 
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performance information. The manipulations of vignette design made it possible 
to isolate the effects of varying performance amounts and performance 
dimensions. However, the results do not tell us how much this influences 
managers’ total evaluation of their subordinates (Study III), and how this 
information is weighted relative to other aspects of the subordinates role, 
behavior, the relationships at work and organizational climate and culture. The 
same applies to the predictions of unethical behavior (Study IV), where other 
aspects of the decision context can influence the motivational effects of 
underperforming relative to the reference point. Studies of performance 
evaluations and behavioral ethics show that several factors in addition to the 
actual performances influence how this information is judged.  
A potential weakness in the data collection approach is that only one method 
(surveys) was used. It would have been an advantage to use additional methods 
to identify how messages and performances are framed. To gain a more 
differentiated understanding of the present research questions, experiments 
allowing observations of actual decision behaviors could have been beneficial. 
Adding information about actual evaluations based on observations, interviews or 
archival data could provide additional insight about how framed communications 
are judged and into the feelings and motivations associated with performance 
deviations.  
Study I-IV have in common that the vignettes are designed so that the 
respondents imagine themselves in the role of observers that are asked to predict 
how others will react or feel. The studies therefore illuminate managers’ beliefs 
about “others at work”. This might reduce the social desirability effects motivated 
by promoting a positive self-image or a positive image of their own organization. 
Research on organizational behavior (see e.g. Argyris, 1999) has shown that 
people hold more optimistic or positive beliefs about themselves than others, but 
also that people more accurately can observe others’ behaviors and the effects of 
others’ than their own.  Research on behavioral ethics has shown that people 
tend to overrate their own honesty, and that they can be poor at predicting 
whether they personally will cheat or act dishonestly (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 
2004). The effects of social desirability and the motives for promoting a positive 
self image might therefore be different for the Study IV relative to the others, 
and perhaps also for Study III relative to Study I and II. In Study II we found 
that the respondents’ personal preferences differed significantly from those 
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attributed to the communicators. Asking about judgments of others might have 
reduced the effects of self-justification or self-presentation needs of the 
respondents.  
In the next four sections the results from Study I, II, III and IV are briefly 
presented.  
4.2 Summary of Paper I. Looking back versus looking ahead: Framing of 
time and work at different stages of a project 
Project progress can be framed in two complementary ways, by referring to the 
past and how much time has been spent or how much work is done, or by 
referring to the future and how much work and time that remains. Logically, 
when 90% is done, 10% remains; when 25% time is spent, 75% is left. “Looking 
back” refers to frames that highlight past expenditures or achievements, while 
“looking ahead” points to what remains to be spent or done. How will managers’ 
statements of progress influence how team members interpret the implied 
meaning of the message? We defined five sets of oppositely framed progress 
statements in terms of percentages of time and work (10/90, 25/75, 50/50, 
75/25, and 90/10), and asked what meanings were embedded in terms of 
satisfaction with project progress and motivation for intensifying work effort. The 
results showed that past oriented temporal statements about time spent implied 
that a project is behind schedule and that the team needs to hurry up, while 
future oriented statements suggested that the project is ahead of schedule and 
that the team can relax a bit. Work progress statements were interpreted to have 
the opposite meaning. Here past oriented statements about work done implied 
that the project is ahead of schedule and that the team can relax, while future 
oriented ones about remaining work suggested that the project is behind 
schedule and that the team needs to intensify their efforts. In line with this, 
speakers preferred work done and time left statements when they were ahead of 
schedule, but not when they were behind. The listeners’ interpretations depended 
on project stage, and  ‘‘hurry up’’ and ‘‘behind schedule’’ interpretations were also 
shown to be dependent upon project stage, and were more prominent in the final 
stages than the initial stages of a project.  
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4.3 Summary of Paper II. Progress framing and sunk costs: How 
managers’ statements about project progress reveal their 
investment intentions 
Can managers’ framing of project progress communicate investment preferences? 
Perhaps past oriented managers want to continue with the sunk-cost option, 
while future oriented ones are interested in new projects instead?   
Study II investigated how reference points in managers’ communication during a 
decision process could influence the listeners’ attributions about what options the 
managers preferred. The results showed that this depended on whether the 
amounts already invested seemed considerable relative to the amounts 
remaining. Past oriented statements about the amounts of work done and 
amounts of money and time spent as “about 75%” suggested continued 
investments, while future oriented ones stating that “about 25%” remained 
implied preferences for a new venture.  Framing progress as “more than 70%” 
suggested that the sunk-cost option was most attractive, but performances that 
were “less than 80%” indicated preference for a new project. In terms of future 
oriented frames, stating that “less than 30%” remains suggest that one is close 
to finishing and should continue working on the project, but if “more than 20%” is 
left this can be a substantial amount that could be invested the new and more 
promising venture instead. If a project team has done or spent “almost 50%”, 
this suggests that progress is substantial and that one should complete the 
project. But if “almost 50%” remains this implies a preference for switching to the 
new option instead, implying that this is quite a significant amount as well. 
Managers who talked about “work done” were assumed to feel more satisfied 
than those who talked about ‘‘work left”. The respondents’ personal preferences 
differed from the ones attributed to the managers, and a majority predicted they 
personally would not be tempted to continue investing in a failing project.  
4.4 Summary of Paper III. More pleased than displeased: Managers’ 
judgments of over- and underperformance 
Imagine a manager who judges the performance of two employees: employee A 
has done 20% better than expected, employee B 20% worse. Will the manager 
feel as happy with employee A as he feels unhappy with employee B? Does it 
matter if the employees’ performance is described as time or money; is spending 
20% less time just as satisfactory as spending 20% less money?  
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This study showed that the strength of positive and negative feelings associated 
with over- and underperformances in appear to be different. Doing better than 
expected is believed to generate stronger satisfaction than performing below 
expectations generates dissatisfaction. This was the case for minor levels of over- 
and underperformance that can happen during a day or week at work involving 
relatively insignificant amounts of money and time, as well as for more 
substantial performance deviations conducted by management teams and firms, 
involving considerable monetary deviations and time differences in terms of 
thousands of hours or months. Temporal performance defined as time on task (in 
hours, days, or weeks) was judged similarly as monetary performance. However, 
when temporal performance was described as completion time relative to a 
milestone or a deadline, deviations became more salient and were expected to 
produce stronger feelings of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Performances that 
meet expectations and match the reference point are predicted to generate 
positive feelings. Managers are more surprised by over- than by 
underperformances.  
4.5 Summary of Paper IV. Managers’ beliefs about misconduct: can 
goals motivate unethical behavior? 
Can contrasting performances with goals increase temptation for overstating what 
is achieved? Do managers believe that low performers are more likely to 
exaggerate than high performers? Is it more tempting to exaggerate close to the 
goal than when further from achieving it?  
On the individual level, Study IV showed that performance goals can enhance the 
temptation to exaggerate performances, particularly for amounts of time spent. 
When goals are achieved, motivation for overstatements was projected to 
diminish.  On the organization level, firms with goals were expected to be more 
likely to overstate how many projects they had completed, how many consulting 
hours they had sold during a year, or to claim that projects were completed faster 
than what was the case. Firms that achieved their goals were supposedly less 
inclined to exaggerate. In the between-groups studies these results not clearly 
supported, and in two of the studies there were no differences between the firms 
with and without goals. The absolute level of firm performance (i.e. low versus 
high performing firms) was not predicted to influence likelihood of misconduct, as 
suggested by some theories of firm misconduct. This is consistent with the 
principles of the value functions, where gains and losses are judged relative to 
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subjective reference points and not by their absolute magnitudes. The managers’ 
beliefs were also consistent with some firm level mechanisms that can enhance 
performance expectations and increase risks for misconduct, such as escalating 
ambitions, over-confidence and over-investing in goal achievement.  
5 General discussion  
The discussion of the present studies is organized in three main sections: 1) 
discussion of implications from Study I and II focused on how framing of 
communication can serve productive pragmatic functions in communication at 
work, 2) discussion of the affective and motivational implications of performance 
deviations based on Study III and IV, and 3) concluding comments about the 
implications of present studies for judgments of performances as work, money 
and time.  
5.1 Reference points and framing of project progress 
Study I and II were designed based on the assumption that reference points can 
be embedded in language and influence listeners’ framing of a message. The 
studies suggest that framed communications effectively can inform listeners’ of a 
speakers’ views or intentions. Interpreting logically similar frames in different 
ways is therefore not a bias, but something that enables effective exchange of 
information and can serve productive pragmatic functions. Study I showed that 
speakers and listeners interpret the embedded meaning of framed progress 
similarly.  This Study also showed that seemingly neutral progress statements 
can contain implicit frames about the speaker’s satisfaction and views about how 
to precede with the task, whereas Study II showed that qualitative modifiers 
added to the quantitative progress amounts can influence the listeners’ 
perceptions more than the quantities alone.   
The pragmatic function of the reference points in the present studies is to serve 
as provisional reference points that accentuate the amounts of progress achieved 
or remaining. Linguistically the statements indicate a contrast between an explicit 
quantity and an implied reference point. Focus on the positive pole of the work 
dimension (work done) implies a downward comparison, whereas focus on the 
negative pole (work left) reflects an upward comparison. If a manager speaks 
about how much is done, the reference point highlights the amount between 
project initiation and present progress, making this seem substantial so there is 
reason to feel satisfied with what is achieved. In contrast, saying that “x of the 
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time is spent” can suggest that more time than expected is spent, making it 
natural to complete the sentence with a request to hurry up. If a manager talks 
about the time spent and work remaining, it is compatible to assume that he is 
concerned with about the project meeting its goals. Also, if a manager 
communicates that the significant amounts have been invested in a project, it is 
more compatible to assume he is concerned about the outcome of that 
investment, rather than showing interest in investing in a in a different project. 
There is therefore nothing unreasonable or irrational about responding differently 
to different frames. These framing effects are consistent with McKenzie and 
Nelson’s (2003) information leakage hypothesis, suggesting that logically 
equivalent frames may imply different reference values and convey different 
messages.  
Study I suggests that work and time frames can have opposite valence when they 
refer to the past versus the future. Looking back, it is positive to have done work, 
but more negative to have spent time. Looking ahead, it is positive to have more 
time left, but more negative to have work remaining to be done.  
This thesis investigates how framed messages referring to one single dimension 
(work, money or time) are interpreted. A central question that is not addressed is 
how messages that combine or frame two or more dimensions might be 
interpreted. This has been denoted “emphasis framing” (Druckman, 2011), and is 
presumably very important for understanding communication in situations that 
involve comparisons or trade-offs between several different perspectives. In 
projects it is for example common to discuss whether it worth spending more 
money to enhance quality and timely progress, or whether investing more work-
effort can enable meet temporal milestones. Some research indicates that 
organizational goals and strategies influence what performance dimensions 
managers attend to (Kessler & Chakrabarti, 1996). Future research could 
investigate how managers’ frames of mind influence what performance 
dimensions (work, money or time) that are emphasized in communication, and if 
the message impact depends on what dimension the manager speaks about. Are 
for example monetary frames weighed more than temporal frames? Future 
research can investigate under what conditions framed messages actually will 
impact peoples’ beliefs or “frames in thought” (Druckman, 2011).  
The conceptual and theoretical implications the results from Study I and II are 
discussed more in-depth in each of the papers. Here I will therefore discuss 
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potential implications of the results in terms of communication in organizations. 
Is framing of performance messages a productive and useful way to state ones’ 
opinions? I will address this question by first referring to literature that argues 
that framing is a useful communication technique that managers should adopt to 
influence others effectively. I will then question whether framing actually can be 
learned and how it needs to be learned to be effective. Lastly, I will discuss if 
framed messages are equally effective in all organizational communication 
situations.  
First of all, the present studies highlight a limited aspect of communication 
processes at work. According to some models of communication in organizations 
(see for example Edmondson & Smith, 2006; Schwartz, 2002), 1) speakers’ 
perspectives of an issue or choice inform their 2) (framed) messages, which are 
3) interpreted and judged relative to the listeners’ perspective of the issue or 
choice, which 4) informs their reaction to the speakers’ message. Study I and II 
thus investigates a limited set of aspects related to how listeners interpret framed 
messages, mainly focused on component 2) and 3) in this simplified model. Even 
if the present studies indicate that people pick up differences in framed messages 
and infer what the speaker means to tell them, such assumptions can produce 
poor communication if they are not explicitly tested. If peoples’ assumptions 
match the speakers’ opinions, framed messages are effective. But if inferred 
meaning does not match intended meaning, and listeners fail to test their 
assumptions, then the effectiveness of such communication can diminish.   
A review of the popular literature on communication for managers (based on 
amazon.com, amazon.co.uk and haugenbok.no) shows that framing of messages 
has been included as a prescriptive recommendation by some authors. One of the 
most popular books Cialdini (2001b) suggests that “contrasts” can enhance what 
is positive or negative about an idea or solution. This idea seems similar to 
Druckman’s (2011) concept of emphasis framing, where the communicator can 
choose to compare different domains, for example contrast economic frames with 
environmental ones to communicate a message effectively. It also has parallels 
with goal framing, and the recommendation is that speakers should accentuate 
positive consequences of following their recommendations or point to the 
negative consequences of not listening to them. This literature (see e.g. Cialdini, 
2001b; Patterson, Grenny, Maxfield, McMillan & Switzler, 2008) seems mainly 
influenced a listener-based perspective on framing. It is focused on what aspects 
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of a message will sound most persuasive to a listener. If one follows the 
recommendations, they “can lead people to concede, comply or change…in 
predictable ways” (Cialdini, 2001a, p. 74). It is implicitly assumed that the 
speaker has an attractive idea or suggestion the he should convince the listener 
to accept or follow. Based on the present studies and the communication model 
discussed above, it can seem like this literature over-promises the effects of 
framing performance statements. It can be argued that framing accentuates 
ones’ perspectives, but it is difficult to argue that the listeners’ perspectives will 
change.  
It has also been questioned whether framing is a skill that can be learned. 
Kahneman (2003; 2011; Kahneman, Lovallo & Sibony, 2011) defines framing as 
an intuitive skill that is part of fast thinking System 1, and proposes that 
individuals cannot avoid being biased when making decisions at work. This 
implies that listeners can be unaware that they are influenced by framed 
messages. Fairhurst (2005) suggests that “framing” can be divided into several 
more specific skills that can be learned. If framing is an automatic and intuitive 
process, learning it requires managers to become aware of their default frames 
and replace them with more effective ones. Applied psychologists have devised 
such learning methods (see e.g. Argyris, 1995; Cialdini, 2001a; Edmondson & 
Smith, 2006; Schwarz, 2002; Schwarz, Davidson, Carlson, McKinney, 2005; 
Smith, 2011), and they involve deliberately planning when to use the new 
frames, micro-level planning of what to specifically say, producing the message 
and evaluating ones effectiveness afterwards. Whether framing can be learned is 
also related to the question of how frames are evoked in speakers, perhaps by 
context or perhaps by deliberate consideration. This is still an unanswered 
empirical question (Keren, 2011). To use framing as an effective communication 
skill speakers need to learn when it is appropriate to use it, be aware when such 
situations arise and remember how to use the communication recipes. The results 
from Study I and II suggest several communication strategies managers need to 
learn: to frame time and work oppositely to influence satisfaction and motivation; 
that the expected framing effects are greatest when a task is half way than for 
the beginning and end phases; to remember to use different linguistic modifiers, 
such as that “more than 70%” is a more positive message than “about 70%”, but 
maybe just as positive as “almost 80%”. This probably exceeds the number of 
self-instructions a manager can give himself in addition to thinking about the 
other aspects of a communication situation, which might limit the usefulness and 
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“actionability” of such advice (Argyris, 1999). For framing to be an effective skill, 
managers thus need to practice it a level where it becomes automatic.  
The benefits of framing messages in organizational communication can depend on 
the purpose of communicating about an issue. The persuasion literature seems 
mainly influenced by a unilateral perspective on communication, where the 
speaker believes he has the “right” perspective, chooses the frame, and 
accordingly frames the message in a convincing manner. Some authors (e.g 
Argyris, 1995, 1999; Edmondson & Smith, 2006) have argued that unilateral 
belief- and action patterns can undermine organizational effectiveness in 
situations that require compromises between different perspectives or 
development of new perspectives. How effective are framed messages in such 
situations? When people react emotionally under pressure, the quality of their 
reasoning and communication can suffer (Edmondson, Roberto & Watkins, 2003; 
Edmondson & Smith, 2006). It has been suggested that people in such situations 
should advocate their perspectives so that others clearly understand them, and 
listen to the others’ perspectives. However, this literature has not explicitly 
defined criteria for what it means to clearly state ones’ opionon. The present 
studies suggest that framing messages about beliefs effectively can influence the 
listeners to infer the speakers’ meaning. If the speaker is open to influence, 
framed messages can be a productive way of engaging in a mutual dialogue. 
Study I and II can thus be interpreted as a contribution to the literature on 
dialogue and organization learning (Argyris, 1995, 1999; Edmondson & Smith, 
2006).  
A last consideration is the ethical aspects of teaching only managers or one party 
in an organization to communicate in ways that intuitively will influence listeners’ 
to just see one aspect on a situation, option or choice. This can be seen as an 
attempt to unilaterally influence others in a concealed way. It is assumed that 
based on limited processing capacity, access to one frame or perspective might 
block access to the complementary one, just like seeing one of the reversible 
figures blocks one from perceiving the other (Keren, 2011). LeBoef and Shafir 
(2003) argue that deliberation does not reduce peoples’ protection from being 
framed, but that learning normative principles can enable people to use these if 
they can detect that they are relevant for the situation or choice at hand. 
Druckman (2004) reported that the effects of equivalence-framed messages 
disappeared if both frames where presented jointly, and that the impact of 
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framed messages could depend on the attitudes and motivation of the listeners. 
Some authors (e.g. Cialdini, 2001b) argue that learning about persuasion 
techniques can protect people from becoming victims of them. If frames 
effectively can carry information about a speaker’s intentions, and they intuitively 
influence listeners, then the most ethical option seems to be to train all members 
of an organization to use them. Managers can then communicate their opinions 
effectively and listeners can protect themselves from being framed by deliberately 
considering complementary frames than the ones communicated.  
To summarize the discussion of Study I and II, framed messages can effectively 
communicate opinions and perspectives. But if listeners act upon their 
assumptions about the inferred meaning and do not explicitly test if they have 
understood the speaker correctly, they risk being misled. There is further no 
guarantee that the listeners’ beliefs actually will be sway in the intended 
direction, and that they will join in on the speakers’ perspectives. It can be 
argued that framed messages are effective in situations where someone has the 
“right” perspective, as well as in situations where different perspectives need to 
be understood. Further research is needed to understand how framing can be 
learned as a communication skill. 
5.2 Reference points and framing of performance  
This section discusses how Study III and Study IV illuminate feelings and 
motivations associated with over- and performances relative to a reference point. 
Consistent with the predictions of the value function in prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), Study IV showed that goals were believed to 
increase the likelihood of misconduct. However, Study III showed that managers 
expect the feelings of satisfaction associated with over-performances to be 
stronger than the feelings of dissatisfaction associated with underperformances, 
which can seem contrary to the idea that “losses loom greater than gains”.  
It is suggested that the emotional valence of performances not only is determined 
by how they turn out relative to a reference point, but also based on 1) whether 
the reference point is a positively valenced goal or the neutral status-quo, 2) to 
what extent the outcome is anticipated or surprising, and 3) how the performance 
is mentally accounted for. It is further suggested that the motivational effects of 
goals on exaggerating achievements not only is determined by the perceived 
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performance gap, but also by 1) moral awareness and 2) the relationship 
between moral judgments and moral behavior.  
5.2.1 Feelings about over- and underperformance 
The results from Study III make good sense if we take into account the emotional 
valence of goals as aspirational reference points and how surprising outcomes can 
be judged differently than expected ones. Although goals can act as reference 
points and “inherit” the properties of the value function (Heath, Larrick, & Wu, 
1999), Study III suggests that performance goals or predictions are not neutral 
reference points that split the range of performances into symmetrical sections of 
gains and losses. In the decision literature reference points are typically defined 
as the status quo with a neutral valence. Goals represent standards or 
expectations that are higher than the status-quo, and can therefore be perceived 
as positively valenced reference points. Achieving a goal is typically associated 
with positive feelings, and exceeding it might be mentally accounted as an 
additional gain. This can serve to enhance the positive feelings associated with 
over-performance that were observed in Study III. The managers evaluated 
performance according to budgets and plans as positive events, implying that 
their “neutral” reference point is “doing a bit less than the goal”.  
Managers’ feelings about performances might not only be based on the gap 
between goals and achievements, but are also influenced by what outcome they 
believe will come. Performances that are unanticipated can be perceived as 
surprises, and surprise can intensify the feelings of (dis-)satisfaction associated 
with the under- or overachievements (Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999; Mellers & 
Ritov, 2010). In Study III most of the vignettes described situations that where 
the performance levels that can be perceived as surprising. Supporting this 
argument, the managers in Study III stated that they based on personal 
experience would find underperformance less surprising than over-performances, 
particularly in the domain of completion time. Managers thus seem accustomed to 
expecting that performances will turn out somewhat below the original goal, 
budget, plan or claim, so that over-performance is subsequently more surprising 
than comparable underperformance. 
However, in one vignette (Vignette 7) where the manager received more specific 
information about what outcome could be expected, the positive and negative 
deviations were predicted to feel equally strong.  Based on information about 
what performance he could anticipate, this manager could then adjust his 
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reference point. Managers’ reference points might thus be adjustable or labile, 
and adapted based on updated performance information. Personal expectations 
might be different than formal goals, and the surprise and valence of a 
performance might differ depending on whether is contrasted with goals or 
subjective expectations. Previous research (e.g, Arkes, Hirshleifer, Jiang, & Lim, 
2008), suggests that shifts in reference point may occur in the direction of the 
realized outcome, and that reference points can change more quickly for gains 
than for losses. If our study reflects performance judgments at work, managers 
will adjust their reference points and expectations based on updated performance 
information from their subordinates.  
The interpretations of the counterfactual (Epstude & Roese, 2011) performances 
in two of the vignettes in Study III (Vignette 6 and 7) are consistent with other 
research showing that unexpected gains tend to enhance positive affect (Gilovich 
& Medvec, 1995; Roese, 1994). When hypothetical goal-achievement was 
contrasted with 20% underperformance, it was predicted to feel more satisfactory 
than when it was contrasted with 20% over-performance. Thus, predicted 
feelings from counterfactual gains and losses seem to follow the same pattern as 
predicted satisfaction from unexpected over- and underperformances. When 
managers know what to expect the predicted emotional impact of counterfactual 
performances is attenuated. 
Study III also illuminates how different kinds of aspirational reference points such 
as goals, budgets, plans, performance claims, predictions, and expectations might 
be defined, adjusted and judged. Reference points created by expectations and 
predictions differ from other reference points by their arbitrariness. They can be 
placed high or low, increased or reduced according to one’s own discretion. 
Failures to attain an expected level of performance can thus be framed as 
performance errors or as prediction errors. It has previously been investigated 
how people can integrate multiple reference points into a combined comparison 
level, or segregate them as individual comparisons (see Ordonez, Connolly & 
Coughlan, 2000). Koop and Johnson (2010) suggest that people can judge gains 
and losses according to at least three reference points: the status quo, their goals 
and their minimal requirements. Our study suggests that subjective expectations 
can be a category of aspirational reference points that influence perceptions and 
feelings differently than formal goals.  
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Research on affective forecasting (for reviews, see Wilson & Gilbert, 2003, 2005) 
shows that people typically overestimate the intensity of feelings associated with 
future failures and successes. However, this so-called impact bias has been 
shown to be stronger for negative events than for positive. Previous research 
shows that people expect negative feelings from future losses to be stronger than 
positive feelings from future gains, which is the opposite effect to what was 
observed in Study III: positive outcomes are believed to make a stronger 
emotional impact than corresponding negative outcomes. This asymmetry 
subsequently cannot be explained as merely a result of impact bias. Moreover, 
predicted feelings might influence managerial decision-making, even if they 
should not match actual feelings. The feelings managers expect to have might 
contribute to the goals they set for their employees’ performance, and how 
management teams expect to feel about future performances might influence 
their aspiration levels as well as their motivation to achieve the goal. 
5.2.2 Mental accounting of performance 
The principles of mental accounting suggest that over- and underperformances 
can be integrated and judged as part of a global account or segregated and 
evaluated as a separate account. Performance deviations can thus be judged as 
proportional amounts or absolute amounts. Study III and IV showed that small 
and less significant deviations that individuals are accountable for during the 
course of a day or week at work were judged similar as greater and more 
significant ones that management teams and firms are accountable for and that 
accumulate during the course of a year. The managers felt equally positive about 
less significant amounts of over-performance as about more significant ones, as 
long as they were proportionally similar.  
Similarly, Study IV showed that it seemed equally tempting to exaggerate by a 
few hours as by thousands of hours or months, as long as the over- and 
underperformances were proportionally similar. However, Study IV also showed 
that the performance dimension deviations are accounted in might the likelihood 
of overstatements. In the two studies that focused on individual consultants’ 
temptations to exaggerate, they were expected to be more likely to overstate 
their time-reports relative to their work reports and money claims, even if the 
proportional amounts of lying were similar. One explanation for this difference is 
that time is psychologically accounted as a more abstract dimension that is more 
difficult to verify than work and money.  
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Referring back to Study III, performance accounts with different scope and 
temporal horizons, monetary performances were judged similarly as temporal 
ones when time was described in terms of number of hours, days, weeks and 
months. Such similar ways of describing monetary and temporal achievements 
could make them appear as comparable amounts of over- and underperformance. 
The managers evaluated the temporal performance deviations in terms of 
performance time (hours, days, weeks, months) similarly as the monetary ones, 
as these amounts can be mentally accounted for in the same manner. However, 
accounting for performance as completion time made the amounts of over- and 
underperformance more salient. The more intense feelings associated with 
completion time can be attributed to the ability of deadlines and milestones to 
partition temporal performances into an expected component and an “error” 
component. This “local” account makes the magnitude of over- or 
underperformance more salient, and thus enhances the positive and negative 
feelings associated with the saving or delay. In the global monetary or 
performance time accounts discrepancies plans are integrated in the total budget, 
and deviations seem emotionally significant based on their percentage of the 
totality. From a local account perspective it is the absolute size of a delay that 
counts. It might also be that the affective intensity evoked by the everyday 
delays (i.e. delivering a presentation two hours late) versus the yearly ones 
(delivering projects two months late after a year) is influenced by different 
degrees of surprise associated with temporally proximate versus long-term 
deviations: delivering a presentation two hours after 13:00 when the boss asked 
for it at 09:00 in the morning, can be more surprising than learning that a 
company’s projects are delayed. In the last case, the managers have probably 
been aware of the deviations for quite some time. 
Study III originally included a section of three vignettes that investigated whether 
performance deviations are judged by their relative size to the total account, or 
by their absolute value. This section is not included in the present revised and re-
submitted version of the paper1, but will be shortly discussed here as it sheds 
light on how managers mentally account for performance deviations. 
Respondents were the same group of managers that took part in Study III. They 
were asked to compare proportionally smaller and nominally larger errors (e.g. 
10%: 100.000 vs. 110.000) with proportionally larger and nominally smaller 

1 The reviewers judged this as a relevant results to publish, but observed that including this additional 
element would make the paper too extensive and complex.  
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errors (e.g. 20%: 10.000 vs. 12.000). In the first case the absolute deviation was 
10.000 and in the last case only 2000, but in the first case the relative error was 
only 10% and in the second 20%. They were asked (in different conditions) 1) to 
evaluate which was the greatest mistake (i.e. deviation between predicted and 
actual performance), or 2) to predict which performance deviation the manager 
would feel most (dis)pleased with. The performance deviations consisted of over- 
and underperformances in terms of work, money and time. The results showed 
that the magnitude of performance mistakes mainly were judged in terms of 
proportions of the total account, whereas managers’ degree of satisfaction were 
determined more by the concrete amounts of gains and losses. The actual 
performance amounts were the same for the vignettes that asked about degrees 
of mistake as the ones who asked about strength of feelings, but the managers 
focused on proportions to determine the magnitudes of deviation, and on 
absolute amounts to determine how they would feel about the deviations. To 
judge a 20% deviation as a larger mistake, it has to be construed relative the 
total account. In contrast, judgment based on a local account will make the 
absolute deviation of 10,000 seem larger than a deviation of merely 2,000. In 
this study, focus on feelings promoted local accounting of absolute values, 
whereas focus on errors stimulated calculation of deviation relative to the total 
global account.  
Thus, focus on feelings stimulated different mental accounting of the 
performances and subsequently different perspectives on the deviations, than 
attention of the degrees of error. In this additional study performance information 
was presented in pairs, promoting a joint evaluation of two sets of deviations. 
The results are somewhat different than the ones in the section of Study III, 
where emphasis was on predicted feelings and each deviation was presented 
separately. This set of results (for money and performance time) suggested that 
global performance accounts were most predominant, and judgments were based 
on proportions so that nominally small and large deviations appeared similar. 
Thus, when separately judging feelings about deviations, proportional mental 
accounting dominated; but in joint evaluations of feelings about two sets of 
deviations, the absolute values loomed greater. This is an interesting result that 
warrants further exploration, and the plan is to add additional data for a future 
publication.  


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5.2.3 Motivation for overstating performance 
Study IV showed that managers believe that goals as reference points can 
motivate individuals and organizations to overstate performances. This idea is not 
new, but the present study seems to be the first one where managers’ beliefs 
about this have been investigated. This is also the first study where the unethical 
side effects of goals have been theoretically interpreted based on reference points 
and the value function of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Mishina, 
Dykes, Block, and Pollock (2010) suggested this as a theoretical explanation of 
the results in their archival study of firm misconduct, but provided no data about 
the managers’ actual decision making. Schweitzer, Ordonez, and Duoma (2004) 
found that goals can motivate students to overstate achievements on a word-task 
in a laboratory setting, but interpreted this in light of goal setting theory. This is 
somewhat surprising as the value function is one of the most popular models for 
decision making for economists and psychologists (Koop & Johnson, 2010).  
Several of the firm level theories of misconduct assume that discrepancies 
between goals and performance can motivate managers to overstate 
achievements, but these models do not explain the psychological mechanisms 
involved. The value function provides clear predictions about how such gaps are 
judged: reference points clearly define performances as sub-standard; adding 
performance increments below the reference point is associated with increasing 
gains in psychological value; diminishing sensitivity strongly motivate 
performance overstatements closer to the goal relative to distant ones; in a loss 
frame, it might be more tempting to choose risky cheating to enhance 
achievements; and goal achievement can be associated with feelings of 
satisfaction, even if one has cheated. Thus, Study IV suggests that individual and 
firm misconduct can be understood based on a common and well-established 
theory. As Greve, Palmer, and Pozner (2010) point out: it is always people who 
perform acts of misconduct, even if firm level theories focus on organizational 
and contextual conditions associated with this outcome.  
Study IV suggests that goals as reference points can have at least two different 
influences on motivation for overstating achievements: they can undermine 
“moral awareness” or skew moral judgments. Models of behavioral ethics in 
organizations (Jones, 1991: Rest, 1986; Trevino, Weaver, and Reynolds, 2009) 
assume that the first stage of moral reasoning involves awareness that one is 
making a choice with moral aspects. When people judge a situation based on an 


 
“ethical frame of mind” (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008), this can elicit 
different judgments than if the same situation is judged from a “business frame” 
(March, 1995; Messick, 1999). If the managers in Study IV responded in a 
business frame of mind, the results suggest that goals can focus managers to 
only consider how to enhance business performances, and to overlook moral 
considerations associated with how they achieve this. This is consistent with 
Barsky’s (2008) argument that goals based on their ability to focus attention can 
influence people to overlook moral aspects of a decision. Introducing business 
goals has been found to stimulate people to focus on these rather than ethical 
considerations (Tenbunsel & Messick, 1999). Cognitive processing of goal and 
performance information can consume cognitive capacity that otherwise might 
have been used to detect and reflect upon ethical aspects of the situation. In this 
perspective, framing a performance relative to a goal can exclude evoking and 
processing of other frames of the situation, such as ethical ones.  
Moral awareness has been widely defined as thoughts about how others are 
affected by a decision (Rest, 1986), and more narrowly to be explicitly aware that 
one is making a moral choice. Jones (1991) suggests that moral frames can be 
evoked by the “moral intensity” of an issue. Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe (2008) 
note that moral awareness is difficult to measure. In most studies people are 
directly asked whether a situation represents an ethical dilemma, a procedure 
that in it self can evoke moral frames of mind, frames that might not otherwise 
be directly activated by the situation. Several aspects of Study IV suggest that 
moral frames might not have been stimulated: the managers were asked if 
someone would exaggerate performance and not if this was an ethical action or 
not; the title of the study “Tempted to exaggerate?” suggested it was about 
motivations to overstate performances and not how immoral or unethical such 
action can seem. Only one question in one of the conditions used the term 
“unethical”. The study did not include information that typically enhances moral 
intensity, such a negative consequences for the managers, their companies or 
social condemnation from the public. Interpreted this way, Study IV shows that 
defining goals and providing information suggesting there is a performance 
shortfall, can focus managers’ attention on this aspect of a situation, and inhibit 
moral awareness and moral considerations.  
However, if the managers were morally aware when responding to Study IV, 
another interpretation is possible: goals can motivate managers to weigh ethical 
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considerations as less important when evaluating a situation. This is consistent 
with Barsky’s (2008) suggestion that goals can distort moral judgments by 
justifying deviations from moral standards (i.e. “because of the goal”), or by 
displacing responsibility for unethical behaviors (i.e. “to achieve the goal”). If the 
managers’ beliefs in the present study are based on a moral frame of mind, then 
the results suggest that goals can influence managers to under-weigh ethical 
considerations.  
What inferences can be drawn about how goals as reference points actually 
influence unethical behaviors? Historically ethical decision-making has been 
conceptualized as a rational process involving conscious deliberation of options 
and outcomes. The influential model of Rest (1986) is such an example, 
suggesting that moral behavior is an outcome of a sequence of stepwise 
deliberate judgments: 1) moral awareness, 2) moral judgment, and 3) moral 
motivation. However, empirical studies have failed to demonstrate a consistent 
relationship between moral awareness and moral judgment; people who are 
morally aware do not necessarily make moral judgments (Barsky, 2008). In 
terms moral behavior as an outcome of moral judgments and motivation, Trevino 
et al (2006) suggest that ethical behavior is a product of individual characteristics 
and organizational conditions. In organizations the association between goal 
setting and actual misconduct can thus be mediated by what kind of goals are 
set. Specific goals are assumed to increase the risk of unethical behavior by 
drawing attention to a limited set of aspects of the outcome, and perhaps leading 
people to overlook “goal irrelevant” moral considerations (Barsky, 2008). Difficult 
goals can have similar effect by motivating people to overlook or discount 
considerations that require attention or are in conflict with achieving the goal. 
Difficult goals can put people under pressure and enhance their tendency to 
reduce cognitive load by processing mainly goal-relevant information and not 
adding cognitive complexity through moral considerations (Barsky, 2008; Street, 
Douglas, Geiger, and Martinko, 2001). Outcome goals are assumed to increase 
the probability of choosing unethical approaches to achieving them (Barsky 2008; 
Ordonez, Schweitzer, Galinsky, & Bazerman, 2009) relative to behavioral goals, 
which more specifically indicate how one should act. Employee involvement in 
goal setting can influence unethical behaviors. The assumption is that if 
employees are involved in discussing the goal(s), this will stimulate thoughts 
about strategies for goal attainment and also increase peoples’ awareness about 
potential moral dilemmas associated with the work towards the goal. On the 
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other hand, non-involvement might foster that employees disengage from ethical 
considerations associated with achieving the goal, and only focus on goal 
achievement in itself (and not moral aspects of how it is attained).  
To summarize, Study IV adds to our understanding of misconduct and unethical 
behavior in organizations by showing that managers believe goals to be 
associated with inflated performance statements. Whether goals actually will 
produce unethical actions, will depend on whether managers are morally aware 
and in an ethical frame of mind. The motivational effects of the goals will further 
be influenced by whether the managers have been involved in defining them, and 
how specific and difficult they are. The organizational systems, culture and 
climate will also be of importance for how the managers deal with performance 
pressures and deviations.  
5.3 Conclusions 
The present studies have addressed four research questions related to how 
reference points and framing of progress and performance in communication at 
work can influence perceptions, feelings, and motivations.  
Question I) was How can framing of progress in terms of past-oriented versus 
future-oriented reference points influence beliefs about whether a project is 
developing as planned or should be accelerated? In this study work and time 
were conceptualized as linear and parallel progress dimensions, and performance 
formulated neutrally and factually as magnitudes relative to the start or the 
completion of the task. Even if the progress statements referred to the same 
“objective” amounts of work and time, framing the messages “looking back” on 
work done or time spent, communicated a different perspective than “looking 
ahead” on work and time remaining. Work frames about amounts done imply 
feelings of satisfaction with progress, but time frames about amounts spent 
suggest that progress is insufficient and work motivation needs to be intensified. 
Reversing the progress frames looking ahead towards completion of a task, 
stimulated switching the implications work and time frames. Work and time thus 
appear as oppositely valenced performance dimensions that stimulate contrasting 
perspectives of satisfaction and task motivation. However, time frames are 
similar to work frames in that they implicitly refer to activity levels and efficiency, 
and suggest what effort is needed to complete a task.  
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Question II) was How does framing of progress in terms of past-oriented versus 
future-oriented reference points suggest whether a manager is promoting further 
investments in an existing but failing project, or advocating to invest a new 
project instead? Study II showed having invested substantial work, money and 
time in a venture promotes beliefs about preferences for further investments, but 
the opposite frame communicates a switch of investment intentions. When 
qualitative modifiers were added to the numerical progress amounts to indicate 
how (in-)significant they were, this seemed to dominate the perceptions of the 
investment intentions. In this study the way in which progress was framed 
dominated the judgments, and seemed more important for the outcome than 
characteristics of the performance dimensions work, money and time.  
Question III) was Do managers feel as satisfied with performances that exceed a 
reference point as they feel dissatisfied with underperformances? This study 
suggested that the feelings associated with performances are determined not only 
by how they turn out relative to a reference point, but also based on the valence 
of the reference point, to what extent the outcome is anticipated or surprising, 
and how the performance is mentally accounted. Goals are positive outcomes, 
surprise can intensify feelings and over-achievements can be perceived as 
psychological add-ons beyond the performance expectations. Subsequently, doing 
better than expected can be associated with stronger feelings of satisfaction, than 
under-performing generates feelings of dissatisfaction. Monetary and temporal 
performance amounts can be judged proportionally relative to a total budget, so 
that the amounts of time and money seem similar to one another. However, 
temporal reference points such as deadlines or milestones promote segregation of 
deviations into local accounts, stimulating people to judge them based on 
absolute values. Deviations in performance time suggest how efficiently work is 
completed; performance time frames not only communicate duration or time 
flow, but also indicate if the frequency of activity per time unit seems sufficient. 
Information about being delayed seems to stimulate frames about wasting time 
or working inefficiently as well.  
Question IV) was Do managers believe that underperforming relative to a 
reference point can promote overstating of achievements? This study showed that 
goals are believed to influence individuals’ motivation to overstate performances, 
particularly in terms of time spent on a task. When goals are achieved, this is 
assumed to inhibit motivation for further performance exaggerations. Beliefs 
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about motivation to cheat seem more influenced by relative performances than 
by absolute achievements; low and high performers are believed to be equally 
prone to misconduct, as long as achievements are contrasted with a higher 
reference point. The motivational effects of goals on misconduct are not only 
determined by perceived performance gaps, but also by moral awareness and 
moral judgments. Moral beliefs about time seem to differ from work and 
monetary ones; lying about a number of time units might seem less 
apprehensible than lying about amounts of money; time spent might be more 
vague and abstract than the concrete amounts of observable work outputs.  
To conclude, the present research has shown that reference points very 
effectively “work” to influence beliefs, feelings and motivation in work contexts.  


 
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Table 1 
Mean probability ratings (1-5) of exaggerated reports for consultants with or without 
a goal (Study 1.1) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Goal     No goal 
   ----------------  --------------- 
   M SD  M SD 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Performance  2.93 (1.21)  2.92 (0.95) 
Money   3.41 (1.10)  2.58 (0.90) 
Time   3.90 (0.81)  2.50 (1.28) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total   3.36 (1.14)  2.67 (1.07) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 35
Table 2 
Mean probability ratings (1-6) of exaggerated reports for consultants with or without 
a goal (Study 1.2) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Goal     No goal 
   ----------------  --------------- 
   M SD  M SD 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Performance  3.38 (0.97)  2.93 (1.17) 
Money   3.00 (1.38)  3.10 (1.52) 
Time (hours)  3.53 (1.13)  2.64 (1.07) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total   3.33 (1.18)  2.87 (1.24) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 36
 
 
Table 3 
Which consultant is more likely to hand in an exaggerated report? Number 
(percentages) of participants selecting consultant with or without goal in two 
conditions (Study 1.3) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Performance as expected    Underperformance 
  ------------------------------ ---------------------------- 
      Goal           No goal   Goal          No goal  χ2        p 
       ----------     ----------            ---------       ----------- 
        n      %       n      %             n       %         n       % 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Performance      24 (30.7) 54  (69.3)      27  (69.3) 12 (30.7)      15.64     .000 
Money       23 (40.3) 54  (59.3)      27  (71.1) 11 (28.9)       17.56     .000 
Time       19 (24.7) 58  (75.3)       27  (71.1)  11 (28.9)      22.80     .000         
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 37
 
Table 4 
Which firm is more likely to hand in an exaggerated report? Number (percentages) of 
participants selecting firm with or without specific target in two conditions (Study 
1.4) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      Performance on target  Performance below target 
      --------------------------- ---------------------------- 
          Goal No goal   Goal          No goal  χ2        p 
       ----------     ----------            ---------       ----------- 
        n      %       n      %             n       %         n       % 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Projects       13 (18.0) 59  (72.0)  49  (69.1)        22   (30.9)   37.80     .000 
Consulting hours  15 (20.3) 57  (69.7)  62  (86.1)        10   (13.9)  61.66     .000 
Completion time    9 (12.7) 62  (87.3)  57  (71.9)        13   (18.1)  66.92     .000         
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 5 
Mean predictions of firms with high, medium and low performance (Study 2.1) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3  
   High    Medium   Low  F (2, 144)     p        
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Likelihood of 
misconduct    2.87    2.91  3.16      0.65        n.s. 
Expected effect 
of incentives    3.16    3.40  3.22             0.62     n.s. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 6 
Mean ratings (1-6) of high and low performing firms that achieve or fail to achieve 
their goals (Study 2.2) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           High performance  Low performance 
   ------------------------------------            -------------------- 
   External goal     Internal goal Internal goal 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Achieves goal.  
Likelihood of misconduct 
    2.95  2.95       3.53 
10% under goal.  
Likelihood of misconduct 
    3.28  3.33      3.24 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 40
 
Table 7 
Which firm is more tempted to report inflated performance? Number (percentages) of 
participants selecting Firm A or Firm B in three conditions (Study 3.1) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Firm A n % Firm B         n     %    binomial p 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------__ 
Condition 1: 95-100  27  (58.7) 60-70        19  (41.3)     n.s. 
Condition 2: 90-100  23  (40.4) 60-70        34  (59.6)     n.s. 
Condition 3: 85-100  11  (26.8) 60-75        30  (73.2)     .025 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 41
 
Table 8 
Which firm is more tempted to report inflated performance? Number (percentages) of 
participants selecting Firm A or Firm B in three conditions (Study 3.2) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Firm  A  n % Firm B         n     %         binomial p 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Condition 4: 95-100  24    (45.3) 40-50        29  (54.7)     n.s 
Condition 5: 90-100  25    (53.2) 40-50        22  (46.8)     n.s 
Condition 6: 85-95  9      (22.0) 40-50        32  (78.0)     0.00 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 42
Table 9 
Which firm acts more unethically? Number (percentages) of participants selecting 
Firm A or Firm B in three conditions (Study 3.2) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Firm A n % Firm B         n        %           binomial p 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Condition 1: 95-100  8    (14.8) 40-50        46  (85.2)         0.00 
Condition 2: 90-100  25  (62.5) 40-50        15  (37.5)          n.s 
Condition 3: 85-95  16  (36.5) 40-50        29  (64.4)          n.s 
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Table 10 
Mean predictions (1-7) of firms with high, medium and low performance (Study 4.1) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3  
   High    Medium   Low  F (2, 144)     p        
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Expected goal  40.27  35.98  4.12    492.5       .000 
Self confidence   4.13    3.88  3.39    14.50       .000 
 44
Table 11 
Mean ratings (1-7) of high and low performing firms that achieve or fail to achieve 
their goals (Study 4.2) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           High performance  Low performance 
   ------------------------------------            -------------------- 
   External goal     Internal goal Internal goal 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Achieves goal 
Future aspiration 5.29  5.82        5.84 
10% under goal 
Future aspiration 4.64  4.85       5.45 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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